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Everything should be made as simple as possible,
but no simpler. { Albert Einstein
ABSTRACT
A fundamental result in mechanism design theory, the so-
called revelation principle, asserts that for many questions
concerning the existence of mechanisms with a given out-
come one can restrict attention to truthful direct-revelation
mechanisms. In practice, however, many mechanisms use a
restricted message space. This motivates the study of the
tradeos involved in choosing simplied mechanisms, which
can sometimes bring benets in precluding bad or promot-
ing good equilibria, and other times impose costs on welfare
and revenue. We study the simplicity-expressiveness trade-
o in two representative settings, sponsored search auctions
and combinatorial auctions, each being a canonical example
for complete information and incomplete information analy-
sis, respectively. We observe that the amount of information
available to the agents plays an important role for the trade-
o between simplicity and expressiveness.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The revelation principle states that any equilibrium out-
come of any mechanism can be obtained in a truthful equilib-
rium of a direct-revelation mechanism, i.e., an equilibrium
in which agents truthfully reveal their types. In practice,
however, the assumptions underlying the revelation princi-
ple often fail: other equilibria may exist besides the truth-
ful one, or computational limitations may interfere. As a
consequence, many practical mechanisms use a restricted
message space. This motivates the study of the tradeos in-
volved in choosing among mechanisms with dierent degrees
of expressiveness. Despite their practical importance, these
tradeos are currently only poorly understood.
In sponsored search auctions, and adopting a complete in-
formation analysis, allowing every agent i to submit a valua-
tion vij for each slot j means that both the Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves (VCG) mechanism and the Generalized Second Price
(GSP) mechanism always admit a Nash equilibrium with
zero revenue [22]. If agents face a small cost for submit-
ting a non-zero bid, this becomes the unique equilibrium.
If instead agent i is asked for a single bid bi, and his bid
for slot j is derived by multiplying bi with a slot-specic
click-through rate j, the zero-revenue equilibria are elimi-
nated. More surprisingly, this simplication does not intro-
duce new equilibria (even when j is not correct for every
agent i), so minimum revenue over all Nash equilibria is
strictly greater for the simplication than for the original
mechanism. Moreover, if valuations can actually be decom-
posed into an agent-specic valuation vi and click-through
rates j, the simplication still has an ecient Nash equi-
librium. Milgrom [22] concluded that simplication can be
benecial and need not come at a cost.
For combinatorial auctions, and adopting an incomplete
information analysis, the maximum social welfare over all
outcomes of a mechanism strictly increases with expressive-
ness, for a particular measure of expressiveness based on
notions from computational learning theory [4]. Implicit in
the result of Benisch et al. [4] is the conclusion that more
expressiveness is generally desirable, as it allows a mecha-
nism to achieve a more ecient outcome in more instances
of the problem.
Each of these results tells only part of the story. While
Milgrom's results on the benets of simplicity are developed
within an equilibrium framework and can be extended be-
yond sponsored search auctions, they critically require set-
tings with complete information amongst agents in order
to preclude bad equilibria while retaining good ones. In
particular, Milgrom does not consider the potential loss ineciency or revenue that can occur when agents are igno-
rant of each other's valuations when deciding how to bid
within a simplied bidding language. Benisch et al., on the
other hand, develop their results on the benets of expres-
siveness (and thus the cost of simplicity) in an incomplete
information context, but largely in the absence of equilib-
rium considerations.
1 In particular, these authors do not
consider the potential problems that can occur due to the
existence of bad equilibria in expressive mechanisms.
Our Contribution The contribution of this paper is
twofold. On a conceptual level, we analyze how dierent
properties of a simplication aect the set of equilibria of
a mechanism in both complete and incomplete information
settings and argue that well-chosen simplications can have
a positive impact on the set of equilibria as a whole; ei-
ther by precluding undesirable equilibria or by promoting
desirable equilibria. We thus extend Milgrom's emphasis on
simplication as a tool that enables equilibrium selection.
On a technical level, we analyze simplied mechanisms for
sponsored search auctions with complete information and
combinatorial auctions with incomplete information.
An important property when analyzing the impact of sim-
plication on the set of equilibria is tightness [22], which
requires that no additional equilibria are introduced. We
observe that tightness can be achieved equally well in com-
plete and incomplete information settings and give a su-
cient condition.
2 Complementary to tightness is a property
we call totality, which requires all equilibria of the original
mechanism to be preserved. To the end of equilibrium selec-
tion, totality needs to be relaxed. Particular relaxations we
consider in this paper are the preservation of the VCG out-
come, i.e., the outcome obtained in the dominant strategy
equilibrium of the fully expressive VCG mechanism, and the
existence of an equilibrium with a certain amount of social
welfare or revenue relative to the VCG outcome. In addi-
tion, one might require that the latter property holds for
every equilibrium of the simplied mechanism.
In the context of sponsored search, one reason to pre-
fer a simplication is to preclude the zero-revenue equilibria
discussed above. Another interesting property of a simpli-
ed GSP mechanism is that it preserves the VCG outcome
even when the assumed click-through rates j are inexact.
Recognizing that this claim cannot be made for the VCG
mechanism under the same simplication, Milgrom [22] uses
this as an argument for the superiority of the GSP mech-
anism. But, this result that GSP is Vickrey-preserving re-
quires an unnatural condition on the relationship between
the assumed click-through rates and prices and thus agents'
bids, and moreover does not preclude alternate simplica-
tions of VCG that succeed in being Vickrey-preserving. In
addition, we observe that the simplications can still suer
arbitrarily low revenue in some equilibrium, in comparison
with the VCG revenue.
In our analysis of sponsored search, we identify a sim-
plied GSP mechanism that preserves the VCG outcome
without requiring any knowledge of the actual click-through
rates, precludes zero-revenue equilibria, and always recov-
1The equilibrium analysis that Benisch et al. provide is in
regard to identifying a particular mechanism design in which
the maximum social welfare achievable in any outcome can
be achieved in a particular Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
2This condition was already considered by Milgrom, but
only in the complete information case.
ers at least half of the VCG payments for all slots but the
rst. For simplied VCG mechanisms, we obtain a strong
negative result: every simplication of VCG that supports
the (ecient) VCG outcome in some equilibrium also has
an equilibrium in which revenue is arbitrarily smaller than
in the VCG outcome.
In the context of combinatorial auctions, paradigmatic of
course of settings with incomplete information, we rst re-
call the previous observations by Holzman et al. [15, 16]
in regard to the existence of multiple, non-truthful, ex-post
equilibria of the VCG mechanism, each of which oers dif-
ferent welfare and revenue properties. In particular, if one
assumes that participants will select equilibria with a par-
ticular (maximum) number of bids, social welfare can dif-
fer greatly among the dierent equilibria, revenue can be
zero for some of them, and the existence of multiple Pareto
optimal equilibria can make equilibrium selection hard to
impossible for participants.
Focusing again on tight simplications, we connect the
analysis of Holzman et al. [15, 16] with tightness, by estab-
lishing that a simplication is tight if and only if bids are re-
stricted to a subset  of the bundles with a quasi-eld struc-
ture [15, 16], with values for the other bundles derived as the
maximum value of any contained bundle. Through insisting
on a tight simplication, we ensure that the worst-case be-
havior is no worse than that of the fully expressive VCG
mechanism, even when  (although simplied) contains too
many bundles for agents to bid on all of them. Moreover,
using a quasi-eld simplication ensures that agents do not
experience regret with respect to the bidding language, in
the sense of wanting to send a message ex post that was pre-
cluded. Finally, as any restriction of the bids to a subset of
the bundles, restricting the bids to a quasi-eld  yields a
mechanism that is maximal in range [23] and makes it a dom-
inant strategy equilibrium for the agents to bid truthfully
on these bundles. Simplication thus enables the mecha-
nism designer to guide equilibrium selection, and our results
suggest that the presence or absence of such guidance can
have a signicant impact on the economic properties of the
mechanism.
The informational assumptions underlying our analysis
are crucial, and the amount of information available to the
agents plays an important role for the tradeo between sim-
plicity and expressiveness. In the sponsored search setting,
both the existence of a zero-revenue equilibrium in the ex-
pressive mechanism, and the existence of the desirable equi-
librium in the simplication, rely on the assumption of com-
plete information. In other words, agents can on one hand
use information about each others' types to coordinate and
harm the auctioneer, but on the other hand, the same in-
formation guarantees that simplied mechanisms retain the
desirable equilibria of the expressive mechanism. In combi-
natorial auctions the contrast is equally stark: while bids on
every single package may be required to sustain an ecient
equilibrium in the incomplete information setting, we show
that such an equilibrium can be obtained with a number
of bids that is quadratic in the number of agents, and po-
tentially exponentially smaller than the number of bundles,
given that agents have complete information.
Related Work Several authors have criticized the revela-
tion principle because it does not take computational aspects
of mechanisms into account. In this context, Conitzer and
Sandholm [10] consider sequential mechanisms that reducethe amount of communication, and non-truthful mechanisms
that shift the computational burden of executing the mech-
anism, and the potential loss when it is executed subopti-
mally, from the designer to the agents. Hyal and Boutilier
[17, 18] propose to circumvent computational problems asso-
ciated with direct type revelation via the automated design
of partial-revelation mechanisms, and in particular study ap-
proximately incentive compatible mechanisms that do not
make any assumptions about agents' preferences. This ap-
proach is very general, but also hard to analyze theoretically,
with complex, regret-based algorithms.
Blumrosen et al. [6] and Feldman and Blumrosen [12] con-
sider settings with one-dimensional types and ask how much
welfare and revenue can be achieved by mechanisms with a
bounded message space. By contrast, we study mechanisms
with message spaces that grow in some parameter of the
problem and may even have innite size, and obtain results
both for one-dimensional and multi-dimensional types.
A dierent notion of simplicity of a mechanism was con-
sidered by Babaio and Roughgarden [3]: the authors show
that among all payment rules that guarantee an ecient
equilibrium when ranking agents according to their bids,
the GSP payment rule is optimally simple in the sense that
prices depend on bids in a minimal way.
Shakkottai et al. [25] study the tradeo between simplicity
and revenue in the context of pricing rules for communica-
tion networks and dene the\price of simplicity"as the ratio
between the revenue of a very simple pricing rule and the
maximum revenue that can be obtained.
2. PRELIMINARIES
A mechanism design problem is given by a set N =
f1;2;:::;ng of agents that interact to select an element from
a set 
 of outcomes. Agent i 2 N is associated with a type i
from a set i of possible types, representing private infor-
mation held by this agent. We write  = (1;:::;n) for a
prole of types for the dierent agents,  =
Q
i2N i for
the set of possible type proles, and  i 2  i for a prole
of types for all agents but i. Each agent i 2 N further em-
ploys preferences over 
, represented by a valuation function
vi : 
  i ! R. The quality of an outcome o 2 
 is typi-
cally measured in terms of its social welfare, which is dened
as the sum
P
i2N vi(o;i) of agents' valuations. An outcome
that maximizes social welfare is also called ecient.
A mechanism is given by a tuple (N;X;f;p), where
X =
Q
i2N Xi is a set of message proles, f : X ! 
 is
an outcome function, and p : X ! R
n is a payment func-
tion. In this paper, we mostly restrict our attention to di-
rect mechanisms, i.e., mechanisms where Xi  i for every
i 2 N. A direct mechanism (N;X;f;p) with X =  is
called ecient if for every  2 , f() is an ecient out-
come. Just as for type proles, we write x i 2 X i for a
prole of messages by all agents but i. We assume quasi-
linear preferences, i.e., the utility of agent i given a mes-
sage prole x 2 X is ui(x;i) = vi(f(x);i)   pi(x). The
revenue achieved by mechanism (N;X;f;p) for a message
prole x 2 X is
P
i2N pi(x).
Game-theoretic reasoning is used to analyze how agents
interact with a mechanism, a desirable criterion being stabil-
ity according to some game-theoretic solution concept. We
consider two dierent settings. In the complete information
setting, agents are assumed to know the type of every other
agent. A strategy of agent i in this setting is a function
si :  ! Xi. In the (strict) incomplete information setting,
agents have no information, not even distributional, about
the types of the other agents. A strategy of agent i in this
setting thus becomes a function si : i ! Xi.
The two most common solution concepts in the complete
information setting are dominant strategy equilibrium and
Nash equilibrium. A strategy si :  ! Xi is a dominant
strategy if for every  2 , every x i 2 X i, and every
xi 2 Xi,
ui((si();x i);i)  ui((xi;x i);i):
A prole s 2
Q
i2N si of strategies si :  ! Xi is a Nash
equilibrium if for every  2 , every i 2 N, and every
s
0
i :  ! Xi,
ui((si();s i());i)  ui((s
0
i();s i());i):
The existence of a dominant strategy si :  ! Xi always
implies the existence of a dominant strategy s
0
i : i ! Xi
that does not depend on the types of other agents. The solu-
tion concept of dominant strategy equilibrium thus carries
over directly to the incomplete information setting. For-
mally, a strategy si : i ! Xi is a dominant strategy in the
incomplete information setting if for every i 2 i, every
x i 2 X i, and every xi 2 Xi,
ui((si(i);x i);i)  ui((xi;x i);i):
The appropriate variant of the Nash equilibrium concept in
that setting is that of an ex-post equilibrium. A prole s 2 Q
i2N si of strategies si : i ! Xi is an ex-post equilibrium
if for every  2 , every i 2 N, and every s
0
i : i ! Xi,
ui((si(i);s i( i));i)  ui((s
0
i(i);s i( i));i):
We conclude this section with a direct mechanism due to
Vickrey [27], Clarke [9], and Groves [14]. This mechanism
starts from an ecient outcome function f and computes
each agent's payment according to the total value of the
other agents, thus aligning his interests with that of society.
Formally, mechanism (N;X;f;p) is called Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves (VCG) mechanism
3 if X = , f is ecient, and
pi() = max
o2

X
j6=i
vj(o;j)  
X
j6=i
vj(f();j):
In the VCG mechanism, revealing types  2  truthfully
is a dominant strategy equilibrium [14]. We will refer to
the resulting outcome as the VCG outcome for , and write
R
VCG() for the revenue obtained in this outcome.
3. SIMPLIFICATIONS
Our main object of study in this paper are simplications
of a mechanism obtained by restricting its message space.
Consider a mechanism M = (N;X;f;p). A mechanism ^ M =
(N; ^ X; ^ f; ^ p) will be called a simplication of M if ^ X  X,
^ fj ^ X = fj ^ X, and ^ pj ^ X = pj ^ X.
We will naturally be interested in the set of outcomes that
can be obtained in equilibrium, both in the original mech-
anism M and the simplied mechanism ^ M.
4 Milgrom [22]
3Actually, we consider a specic member of a whole family
of VCG mechanisms, namely the one that uses the Clarke
pivot rule.
4In the following, we will simply talk about equilibria with-
out making a distinction between the dierent equilibriumdenes a property he calls tightness, which requires that the
simplication does not introduce any additional equilibria.
More formally, simplication ^ M will be called tight if every
equilibrium of ^ M is an equilibrium of M.
5 Tightness en-
sures that the simplied mechanism is at least as good as
the original one with respect to the worst outcome obtained
in any equilibrium. It does not by itself protect good equi-
librium outcomes, and we will in fact see examples of tight
simplications that eliminate all ex-post equilibria.
A property that will be useful in the following is a variant
of Milgrom's outcome closure for exact equilibria. It requires
that for every agent, and for every choice of messages from
the restricted message spaces of the other agents, it is op-
timal for the agent to choose a message from his restricted
message space. More formally, a simplication (N; ^ X; ^ f; ^ p)
of a mechanism (N;X;f;p) satises outcome closure if for
every  2 , every i 2 N, every ^ x i 2 ^ X i, and every
xi 2 Xi there exists ^ xi 2 ^ Xi such that ui((^ xi; ^ x i);i) 
ui((xi; ^ x i);i).
This turns out to be sucient for tightness in both the
complete and incomplete information case.
6
Proposition 1 (Milgrom [22]). Every simplication that
satises outcome closure is tight with respect to both Nash
and ex-post equilibria.
One way to guarantee good behavior in the best case is
by requiring that a simplication ^ M preserves all equilibria
of the original mechanism M, in the sense that for every
Nash equilibrium of M, there exists an equilibrium of ^ M
that yields the same outcome and payments. We will call a
simplication satisfying this property total, and will return
to total mechanisms in Section 6. To the end of equilibrium
selection totality clearly needs to be relaxed, by requiring
that only certain desirable outcomes are preserved. A typi-
cal desirable outcome in many settings is the VCG outcome.
For example, although this outcome has some shortcom-
ings in fully general combinatorial auction domains [2], it
remains of signicant interest in settings with unit-demand
preferences, such as sponsored search. We will call simpli-
cation ^ M Vickrey-preserving if for every  2 , it has an
equilibrium that yields the VCG outcome for .
4. SPONSORED SEARCH AUCTIONS
In sponsored search (see, e.g., [20]), the agents compete for
elements of a set S = f1;:::;kg of slots, where k  n. Each
outcome corresponds to a one-to-one assignment of agents
to slots, i.e., 
  f1;:::;ng
N such that oi 6= oj for all
o 2 
 and i;j 2 f1;:::;ng with i 6= j. We will assume that
v(o;i) = 0 if oi > k, and that there are no externalities, i.e.,
vi(o;i) = vi(o
0;i) if oi = o
0
i. In slight abuse of notation,
we will write vi(j;i) for the valuation of agent i for slot j.
We consider simplications of two mechanisms, the
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism and the Gener-
alized Second Price (GSP) mechanism, and analyze their
notions. Unless explicitly noted otherwise, our results con-
cern Nash equilibria in the complete information case and
ex-post equilibria in the incomplete information case.
5Milgrom [22] considers a slightly stronger notion of tight-
ness dened with respect to (pure-strategy) -Nash equilib-
ria.
6Milgrom stated the result only for complete information,
but the proof goes through for incomplete information as
well.
behavior for dierent spaces of type proles, which we de-
note by , 
>, and 
. In , valuations can be arbitrary
non-negative numbers. 
> adds the restriction that valua-
tions are strictly decreasing, i.e., vi(j;i) > vi(j + 1;i) for
every  2 
>, i 2 N, and j 2 f1;:::;k   1g. Valuations in

 are assumed to arise from \clicks" associated with each
slot and a valuation per click. In other words, there ex-
ists a xed click-through rate vector  2 R
n
> = f
0 2 R
n :

0
i > 
0
j if i < jg, which may or may not be known to the
mechanism, and vi(j;i) = j vi(i) for some vi(i) 2 R0.
Thus, j = 0 if j > k, and it will be convenient to assume
that 1 = 1. We nally dene 	 =
S
2Rn
> 
, and observe
that 	  
>  .
The message an agent i 2 N submits to the mechanisms
thus corresponds to a vector of bids xi;j 2 R for slots j 2 S.
Given a message prole x 2 X, the VCG mechanism assigns
each agent i a slot fi(x) = oi so as to maximize
P
i xi;oi, and
charges that agent pi(x) = maxo02

P
j6=i xj;o0
j  
P
j6=i xj;oj.
The GSP mechanism is dened via a sequence of second-
price auctions for slots 1 through k: slot j is assigned to
an agent i with a maximum bid for that slot at a price
equal to the second highest bid, both with respect to the
set of agents who have not yet been assigned a slot, i.e.,
fi(x) = oi such that xi;j = maxi02N:oi0j xi0;j and pi(x) =
maxi02N:oi0>j xi;j.
4.1 Envy-Freeness and Efﬁciency
The original analysis of GSP due to Edelman et al. [11]
and Varian [26] focuses on equilibria that are \locally envy-
free."
7 Assume that  2 
, and consider an outcome in
which agent i is assigned slot i, for all i 2 N. Such an
outcome is called locally envy-free if, in addition to being
a Nash equilibrium, no agent could increase his utility by
exchanging bids with the agent assigned the slot directly
above him, i.e., if for every i 2 f2;:::;ng, i  vi(i)   pi 
i 1  vi(i)   pi 1. Restricting attention to envy-free equi-
libria immediately solves all revenue problems: as Edelman
et al. point out, revenue in any locally envy-free equilib-
rium is at least as high as that in the dominant-strategy
equilibrium of the VCG auction. Conversely, Milgrom's ob-
servation concerning zero-revenue equilibria contains an im-
plicit critique of the assumptions underlying the restriction
to equilibria that are envy-free. It will be instructive to
make this critique explicit.
Edelman et al. argue that an equilibrium where some
agent i envies some other agent j assigned the next higher
slot is not a reasonable rest point of the bidding process,
because agent i might increase the price paid by agent j
without the danger of harming his own utility should j re-
taliate. There are two problems with this line of reasoning.
First, it is not clear why agent j should retaliate, especially
if he is worse o by doing so. Second, agent i might in fact
have a very good reason not to increase the price paid by j,
like a desire to keep prices low in the long run through tacit
collusion.
We may instead ask under what conditions there exists a
bid xi;j for agent i on slot j such that (i) agent j is forced
out of slot j, in the sense that it becomes a better response
for j to underbid i, and (ii) agent i is strictly better o after
this response by j than at present. This is the case exactly
7Varian calls these equilibria \symmetric equilibria."when
i  vj(j)   pi > j  vj(j)   xi;j and
j  vi(i)   xi;j > i  vi(i)   pi;
(1)
where pi is the price currently paid by agent i. The second
inequality assumes that j will respond by bidding just below
the bid xi;j of agent i, such that this becomes i's new price.
An equilibrium that does not allows deviations as above
will be called two-step stable. It turns out that two-step
stability exactly characterizes the set of ecient equilibria.
Proposition 2. Let  2 R
n
>,  2 
. Then, an equilibrium
is two-step stable if and only it is ecient.
Proof. Rewriting (1), it must hold that
xi;j > (j   i)  vj(j) + pi and
xi;j < (j   i)  vi(i) + pi:
Clearly, a bid xi;j with this property exists if and only if
vi(i) > vj(j). In turn, agents i and j such that vi(i) >
vj(j) exist if and only if the current assignment is inecient.
This result provides a very strong argument against inef-
cient equilibria as rest points of the bidding process, much
stronger than the argument against equilibria that are not
envy-free. In the context of sponsored search auctions we
will therefore restrict our attention to ecient equilibria. It
is worth noting at this point that the set of ecient equi-
libria forms a strict superset of the set of locally envy-free
equilibria, and in particular contains the zero-revenue equi-
libria identied by Milgrom and discussed next.
4.2 Comments on Milgrom’s Analysis
Milgrom [22] observed that for every prole of agent types,
both VCG and GSP have a Nash equilibrium that yields
zero revenue, and that this equilibrium in fact becomes the
unique equilibrium if there is a small cost associated with
submitting a positive bid. To alleviate this fact, he proposed
to restrict the message space of both VCG and GSP to ^ X =
f(1  bi;:::;k  bi) : bi 2 R0g for some  2 R
n
>.
The following proposition summarizes our knowledge
about the resulting simplications, which we will refer to
as -VCG and -GSP. Most of these observations were al-
ready proved or at least claimed by Milgrom.
Proposition 3. Let  2 R
n
>. Then, -GSP and -VCG
are tight on , have positive revenue on 
> if n;k  2, and
are Vickrey-preserving on 
.
Assuming that the click-through rate vector  is known,
both -VCG and -GSP look very appealing: they elimi-
nate all zero-revenue equilibria, without aecting the truth-
ful equilibrium and without introducing any new equilibria.
In practice, however, the relevant click-through rates may
not be known. A somewhat more realistic model assumes a
certain degree of heterogeneity among the population gen-
erating the clicks. More precisely, a certain fraction of
this population is assumed to be \merely curious," such
that clicks by this part of the population do not generate
any value for the agents. This introduces an information
asymmetry, where the mechanism observes the overall click-
through rate vector , while agents derive value from a dif-
ferent click-through rate vector .
8 In the following we will
8As Milgrom [22] points out,\if the search company observes
clicks but not sales or value for each position, its auction rule
assume that  is the same for all agents, and that  is again
normalized such that 1 = 1 and j = 0 if j > k.
For a slight variation of our model, in which there is a
small dependence between  and ,
9 Milgrom established
a separation between GSP and VCG: -GSP retains the
VCG outcome in situations where -VCG fails to do so. We
obtain an analogous observation in our model. The proof of
the following result is given in the full version of the paper,
where we also establish that -VCG is usually not Vickrey-
preserving.
Proposition 4. Let ; 2 R
n
>. Then, -GSP is
Vickrey-preserving on 
 if and only if the sequence
fpj()=jgj=1;:::;k, where pj() =
Pk
i=j(vi+1(i+1)  (i  
i+1)), is decreasing.
But this line of reasoning seems a bit problematic for two
reasons. First, there seems no reason to believe that the
condition relating prices (and thus bids) and click-through
rates in Proposition 4 would be satised in practice. Second,
the above discussion only shows superiority of GSP over
VCG with respect to a particular simplication, and it might
well be the case that there exists a dierent simplication of
VCG mechanism with comparable or even better properties.
An additional observation that we make, in regard to
the ability of these simplications to eliminate zero-revenue
equilibria, is that there exist type proles for which the mini-
mum equilibrium revenue can be arbitrarily small compared
to the revenue obtained in the VCG outcome.
Theorem 1. Let ;r > 0. Then there exist  2 R
n
> and
 2 
 such that R
VCG()  r and -VCG has an equilib-
rium with revenue at most . Similarly, there exist  2 R
n
>
and  2 
 such that R
VCG()  r and -GSP has an
equilibrium with revenue at most .
Proof. We consider a setting with three agents and three
slots. The construction can easily be extended to an arbi-
trary number of agents and slots.
For -VCG, let vi(i) = r + 1 for all i 2 N. Let 1 = 1,
2 = 1=(r+1), and 3 = 1=(2r+2). It is easily veried that
the bids b1 = r+1 and b2 = b3 =  form a Nash equilibrium
of -VCG. Given these bids, -VCG assigns slot 1 to agent 1
at price  =(2r+2), and slots 2 and 3 to agents 2 and 3 at
prices =(r+1) =(2r+2) and zero. This yields revenue .
In the truthful equilibrium of the VCG mechanism, on the
other hand, the price is r+=(r+1) =(2r+2) for the rst
slot, =(r + 1)   =(2r + 2) for the second slot, and zero for
the third slot, for an overall revenue of r + =(r + 2).
For -GSP, again let vi(i) = r + 1 for all i 2 N. Let
 = =(r + 2), 1 = 1, 2 = (1 + )=(r + 1), and 3 =
1=(r + 1). It is easily veried that the bids b1 = r + 1 and
b2 = b3 = =(1 + )  (r + 1) form a Nash equilibrium of
-GSP. Given these bids, -GSP assigns slot 1 to agent 1 at
price =(1+)(r+1), and slots 2 and 3 to agents 2 and 3 at
prices  and zero. This yields revenue =(1+)(r+1)+  .
In the truthful equilibrium of the VCG mechanism, on the
other hand, the price is r for the rst slot,  for the second
can entail adjusting bids in proportion to clicks but not in
proportion to value" (p. 68).
9Milgrom assumes that there is a fraction  of shoppers
with click-through rate vector  and a fraction (1   ) of
curious searchers with click-through rate vector . The click-
through rate vector  observed by the search provider is then
given by j =   j + (1   )  j.slot, and zero for the third slot, for an overall revenue of
r + .
4.3 A Sense in which GSP is Superior to VCG
The above observations raise the following prominent
question: does there exist a simplication that preserves the
VCG outcome despite ignorance about the true click-through
rates that aect bidders' values, and if so, can this simplica-
tion achieve improved revenue relative to the VCG outcome,
in every equilibrium?
For GSP the answer is surprisingly simple: a closer look at
the proofs of Proposition 3 and Proposition 4 reveals that by
ignoring the observed click-through rates , and setting  =
1 = (1;:::;1) instead, one obtains a simplication that is
tight, guarantees positive revenue, and is Vickrey-preserving
on all of 	. This strengthens Proposition 3 over the claims
for -GSP and -VCG.
Corollary 1. -GSP is tight on 	, has positive revenue
on 	 if n;k  2, and is Vickrey-preserving on 	, if and
only if  = 1 = (1;:::;1).
The direction from left to right follows by observing that,
for every  6= 1, we can nd a  such that the condition of
Proposition 4 is violated.
In light of Theorem 1, and given the arguments in favor
of ecient equilibria, we may further ask for the minimum
revenue obtained by 1-GSP in any ecient equilibrium. It
turns out that 1-GSP always recovers at least half of the
VCG revenue for all slots but the rst.
Theorem 2. Let  2 R
n
>,  2 
, and assume that v1(1) 
  vn(n). Then, every ecient equilibrium of 1-GSP for
 yields revenue at least
1
2
 
R
VCG()  
k X
j=1
(j   j+1)  vj+1(j+1)
!
.
Proof. Let b() be a bid prole corresponding to an ecient
equilibrium of 1-GSP. It then holds that b1()    bn(),
and for all i 2 f1;:::;kg, 1-GSP assigns slot i to agent i at
price pi() = bi+1(). A necessary condition for b() to be
an equilibrium is that for every agent j 2 N, bj() is large
enough such that none of the agents i > j would prefer being
assigned slot j instead of i. In particular, for every i 2 N,
i+1  vi+1(i+1)   pi+1()  i  vi+1(i+1)   bi() and
i+2  vi+2(i+2)   pi+2()  i  vi+2(i+2)   bi().
Since pi() = bi+1() and by rearranging,
bi()  (i   i+1)  vi+1(i+1) + pi+1()
= (i   i+1)  vi+1(i+1) + bi+2() and
bi()  (i   i+2)  vi+2(i+2) + pi+2()
 (i+1   i+2)  vi+2(i+2) + bi+3().
If we repeatedly substitute according to the rst inequality,
we obtain
bi() 
b
k i
2 c X
j=1
(i+2j 2   i+2j 1)  vi+2j 1(i+2j 1) and
bi() 
b
k i
2 c X
j=1
(i+2j 1   i+2j)  vi+2j(i+2j).
By adding the two inequalities,
2  bi() 
k X
j=i
(j   j+1)  vj+1(j+1),
and, since pi() = bi+1(),
2  pi() 
k X
j=i+1
(j   j+1)  vj+1(j+1).
Now recall that R
VCG() =
P
i2N ri(), where
ri() =
k X
j=i
(j   j+1)  vj+1(j+1).
Thus,
X
i2N
2  pi() 
X
i2N
ri()  
k X
j=1
(j   j+1)  vj+1(j+1).
The revenue obtained in any ecient equilibrium of 1-GSP
is therefore at least
X
i2N
pi() 
1
2
 
R
VCG()  
k X
j=1
(j   j+1)  vj+1(j+1)
!
.
Our analysis also leads to a satisfactory contrast be-
tween 1-GSP and simplications of VCG: any simplica-
tion of VCG that does not observe the value-generating
click-through rates, and is Vickrey-preserving for all possible
choices of these click-through rates, must admit an ecient
equilibrium with arbitrarily low revenue.
Theorem 3. Let ^ M be a simplication of the VCG mecha-
nism that is Vickrey-preserving on 	. Then, for every  2 	
and every  > 0, there exists an ecient equilibrium of ^ M
with revenue at most .
Proof. Fix  2 R
n
> and consider an arbitrary type prole
 2 
  	. Order the agents such that v1(1)   
vn(n).
The proof proceeds in two steps. First we will argue that
for some c  0, every  > 0, and all i 2 N, ^ Xi must contain
a message x

i corresponding to bids bij such that bii = i 
vi(i)+c, bij  ivi(i)+c+ for 1  j < i and bij  c+
for i < j  k. These messages will then be used to construct
an equilibrium with low revenue.
To show that the restricted message spaces ^ Xi must con-
tain messages as described above, we show that these mes-
sages are required to reach the VCG outcome for a dierent
type prole 
0 2 
0
 	 for a particular 
0 2 R
n
>. Denote
by pi(
0) the price of slot i for type prole 
0. We know that
for j 2 f2;:::;kg, 
0
j  vj(
0
j) = 
0
j 1  vj(
0
j)   pj 1(
0) (see,
e.g., [22]). Consider an arbitrary  > 0. If we choose 
0 such
that 
0
1  
0
i and 
0
i+1 are small enough, we can choose 
0 as
above such that
pj(
0)   pi(
0)   for j < i and
pi(
0)   pj(
0)  i  vi(i)    for j > i.
A well-known property of the VCG outcome in the assign-
ment problem is its envy-freeness (see, e.g., [21]): denotingby bij the bid of agent i on slot j and by pj the price of
slot j, it must hold for every agent i that
bii   pi  bij   pj for all j 2 S.
For type prole 
0, we thus obtain
bij   bii  pj(
0)   pi(
0)   for j < i and
bii   bij  pi(
0)   pj(
0)  i  vi(i)    for j > i.
Using messages x

i, we now construct an ecient equilib-
rium with low revenue. Clearly, the allocation that assigns
slot i to agent i is still ecient under message prole x
.
Furthermore, for all j 2 f1;:::;kg, the VCG price of slot j
under x
 goes to zero as  goes to zero. In particular, we
can choose  such that the overall revenue is at most . We
nally claim that there exists some 
0 > 0 such that x
 is an
equilibrium for every  with 
0 >  > 0. To see this, recall
that ivi(i) > j vi(i) for j > i, so ui(x
;i) > j vi(i)
for some small enough . If, on the other hand, agent i
was assigned a slot j < i, his payment would be at least
j  vj(j)    > j  vi(i)   . This would leave him with
utility at most , which can be chosen to be smaller than
ui(x
;i).
It is worth noting that despite having a reasonably good
lower bound on revenue, 1-GSP does not quite succeed in cir-
cumventing Theorem 1: there exists a type prole for which
only the rst slot generates a signicant amount of VCG
revenue, and an equilibrium of 1-GSP for this type prole
in which revenue is close to zero. On the other hand, for a
wide range of click-through rates, there will be a large gap
between the minimum revenue of 1-GSP and simplications
of VCG in ecient equilibria.
Moreover, the revenue separation between simplications
of GSP and VCG only applies to simplications of the lat-
ter that are Vickrey-preserving. Given how central the VCG
outcome has been to the analysis of sponsored search auc-
tions, this seems a reasonable property to impose. Never-
theless, it is an interesting question whether the result can
be strengthened further.
5. COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS
Mechanisms for combinatorial auctions allocate items
from a set G to the agents, i.e., 
 =
Q
i2N 2
G such that
for every o 2 
 and i;j 2 N with i 6= j, oi \ oj = ;. We
make the standard assumption that the empty set is val-
ued at zero and that valuations satisfy free disposal, i.e.,
for all i 2 N, i 2 i, and o;o
0 2 
, vi(o;i) = 0 when
oi = ; and vi(o;i)  vi(o
0;i) when oi  o
0
i. The lat-
ter condition also implies that each agent is only interested
in the package he receives, and we sometimes abuse nota-
tion and write vi(C;i) for the valuation of agent i for any
o 2 
 with oi = C. We further write k = jGj for the
number of items, W(o;x) =
P
j2N vj(o;xj) for the social
welfare of outcome o 2 
 under message prole x 2 X, and
Wmax(x) = maxo2
 W(o;x) for the maximum social welfare
of any outcome. Finally, for every agent i 2 N, message
xi 2 X, and bundle of items B  G we write xi(B) for
agent i's bid on bundle B.
The VCG mechanism makes it a dominant strategy for
every agent to bid his true valuation for every bundle of
items. Since the number of such bundles is exponential in
the number of items, however, computational constraints
might prevent agents from playing this dominant strategy
(even for a well-crafted bidding language [24, 19]). In light
of these results, and in light of the observation that simpli-
cations can help to isolate useful equilibria, it is interesting
to ask which other (ex-post) equilibria the VCG auction can
have. Holzman and Monderer [15] showed that these equi-
libria are precisely the projections of the true types to those
subsets of the set of all bundles that form a quasi-eld. Let
  2
G be a set of bundles of items such that ; 2 . 
is called a quasi-eld if it is closed under complementation
and union of disjoint subsets, i.e., if
 B 2  implies B
c 2 , where B
c = G n B and
 B;C 2  and B \ C implies B [ C 2 .
For a message xi 2 Xi, write x

i for the projection of xi to
, i.e., for the unique message such that for every bundle
B  G of items,
x

i (B) = max
B02;B0B
xi(B
0):
The characterization given by Holzman and Monderer is
subject to the additional constraint of variable participation:
a strategy prole s for a set N of agents is an equilibrium of
a VCG mechanism under variable participation if for every
N
0  N, the projection of s to N
0 is an equilibrium of every
VCG mechanism for N
0.
Theorem 4 (Holzman and Monderer [15]). Consider a
VCG combinatorial auction with a set N of agents and a
set G of items. Then, a strategy prole s = (s1;:::;sn) is
an ex-post equilibrium of this auction under variable par-
ticipation if and only if there exists a quasi-eld   2
G
such that for every type prole  and every agent i 2 N,
si(i) = 

i .
Intuitively, the social welfare obtained in these\bundling"
equilibria decreases as the set of bundles becomes smaller.
A simple argument shows, for example, that welfare in the
bundling equilibrium for , where jj = 2
m for some m 
k, can be smaller by a factor of k=m than the maximum
welfare. For this, consider a setting with k agents such that
each agent desires exactly one of the items, i.e., values this
item at 1, and each item is desired by exactly one of the
agents. Clearly, maximum social welfare in this case is k.
On the other hand, since  is a quasi-eld, it cannot contain
more than m bundles that are pairwise disjoint. Therefore,
by assigning only bundles in , one can obtain welfare at
most m.
Welfare can also dier tremendously among quasi-elds of
equal size, which suggests an opportunity for simplication.
Proposition 5. Let G be a set of items, k = jGj, and m 
k. Then there exist quasi-elds ;
0  2
G with jj = j
0j =
2
m and a type prole  such that
Wmax(
)
Wmax(0)

m
dm2=ke
:
Proof. Consider a partition of G into sets G1;:::;Gm of
size d
k
me or b
k
mc, and let  be the closure of fG1;:::;Gmg
under complementation and union of disjoint sets. For ev-
ery i, 1  i  m, choose an arbitrary gi 2 Gi, and dene
 = (1;:::;m) such that for every i with 1  i  m,
vi(X;i) = 1 if gi 2 X and vi(X;i) = 0 otherwise.
Clearly, Wmax(
) = m. Now consider a second parti-
tion of G into sets G
0
1;:::;G
0
m of size d
k
me or b
k
mc suchthat G
0
j  fgi : (j   1)bk=mc + 1  i  jbk=mcg, and
let 
0 be the closure of fG1;:::;Gmg under complemen-
tation and union of disjoint sets. It is then easily veried
that Wmax(
0
)  dm=(k=m)e = dm
2=ke, and the claim
follows.
Moreover, agents might disagree about the quality of the
dierent bundling equilibria of a given maximum size. In
particular, the set of these equilibria might contain several
Pareto undominated equilibria, but no dominant strategy
equilibrium. From the point of view of equilibrium selection,
this is the worst possible scenario.
Example 1. Let N = f1;2;3g, G = fA;B;Cg, and consider
a type prole  = (1;2;3) such that
v1(X;1) =
8
> <
> :
4 if fA;Cg  X,
3 if A 2 X and C = 2 X
1 otherwise;
v2(X;2) =
(
3 if fA;Cg  X or fB;Cg  X and
0 otherwise;
v3(X;3) =
(
1 if B 2 X
0 otherwise.
Clearly, at least four bids are required to express 1. Since
a quasi-eld on G must contain both the empty set and G
itself, there are four quasi-elds of size four or less:

1 = f;;fAg;fB;Cg;fA;B;Cgg

2 = f;;fBg;fA;Cg;fA;B;Cgg

3 = f;;fCg;fA;Bg;fA;B;Cgg

4 = f;;fA;B;Cgg
For i 2 f1;2;3;4g, write 
i = (
i
1 ;
i
2 ;
i
3 ) for the pro-
jection of  to 
i. The following is now easily veried. In
the VCG outcome for 
1, agent 1 is assigned fAg at price 0
for a utility of 3, and agent 2 is assigned fB;Cg at price 1
for a utility of 2. In the VCG outcome for 
2, agent 1 is
assigned fA;Cg at price 3 for a utility of 1, and agent 3 is
assigned fBg at price 0 for a utility of 1. Finally, in the
VCG outcome for 
3 and 
4, agent 1 is assigned fA;B;Cg
at price 3 for a utility of 1. The outcomes for 
1 and 
2 are
both Pareto undominated. Also observe that social welfare
is greater for 
1, while 
2 yields higher revenue.
Finally, the projection to a quasi-eld can result in an
equilibrium with revenue zero, even if revenue in the dom-
inant strategy equilibrium is strictly positive. This is illus-
trated in the following example. It should be noted that this
example, as well as the previous one, can easily be general-
ized to arbitrary numbers of agents and items and a large
range of upper bounds on the size of the quasi-eld.
Example 2. Let N = f1;2;3g, G = fA;B;C;Dg, and con-
sider a type prole  = (1;2;3) such that
v1(X;1) =
(
2 if fA;Dg  X and
0 otherwise;
v2(X;2) =
8
> <
> :
2 if fA;Bg  X,
1 if B 2 X and A = 2 X, and
0 otherwise;
v3(X;3) =
(
2 if C 2 X, and
0 otherwise.
In the VCG outcome for , agent 1 is assigned fA;Dg
at price 1, agent 2 is assigned fBg at price 0, and agent 3
is assigned fCg at price 0, for an overall revenue of 1. In
the VCG outcome for 
, on the other hand, where  =
f;;AB;CD;ABCDg, agent 2 is assigned fA;Bg and agent 3
is assigned fC;Dg, both at price 0. Revenue is 0 as well.
In theory, one way to solve these problems is to simplify
the mechanism, and articially restrict the set of bundles
agents can bid on. Given a set   2
G of bundles, call
-VCG the simplication of the VCG mechanism obtained
by restricting the message spaces to ^ Xi  Xi such that for
every ^ xi 2 ^ Xi and every bundle of items B  G,
^ xi(B) = max
B02;B0B
^ xi(B
0):
In other words, -VCG allows agents to bid only on elements
of  and derives bids for the other bundles as the maximum
bid on a contained bundle. It is easy to see that -VCG is
maximal in range [23], i.e., that it maximizes social welfare
over a subset of 
. It follows that for each agent, truthful
projection onto  is a dominant strategy in -VCG.
This shows that simplication can focus attention on a fo-
cal (truthful) equilibrium and thus avoid equilibrium selec-
tion along a Pareto frontier. As Proposition 5 and the above
examples suggest, this can have a signicant positive impact
on both social welfare and revenue. It does not tell us, of
course, how  should be chosen in practice. One understood
approach for maximizing social welfare without any knowl-
edge about the quality of dierent outcomes, and without
consideration to  being a quasi-eld, is to partition G ar-
bitrarily into m sets of roughly equal size, where m is the
largest number of bundles agents can bid on. The welfare
thus obtained is smaller than the maximum social welfare
by a factor of at most k=
p
m [16]. If additional knowledge is
available, however, it may be possible to improve the result
substantially, as the above results comparing the outcomes
for dierent values of  show.
With that being said, there are (at least) two additional
properties that are desirable for a simplication: that -
VCG is tight, and that  is a quasi-eld. Tightness ensures
that no additional equilibria are introduced as compared to
the fully expressive VCG mechanism, such that the quality
of the worst equilibrium outcome of the simplication is no
worse than that of the original mechanism. This remains
important when  may still be too large for agents to use
its full projection, in which case agents would again have
to select from a large set of possible ex-post equilibria. By
requiring that  is a quasi-eld, in addition to being a dom-
inant strategy equilibrium of -VCG, truthful projection to
 is also an ex-post equilibrium of the fully expressive VCG
mechanism, and thus stable against unrestricted unilateral
deviations. This ensures that agents do not experience re-
gret, in the sense of being prevented from sending a message
they would want to send given the messages sent by the other
agents.
It turns out that these two requirements are actually
equivalent, i.e., that -VCG is tight if and only if  is a
quasi-eld. The following result holds with respect to both
Nash equilibria and ex-post equilibria.Theorem 5. Let   2
G such that ; 2 . Then, -VCG is
a tight simplication if  is a quasi-eld, and this condition
is also necessary if n  3.
Proof. For the direction from right to left, assume that 
is a quasi-eld. By Proposition 1 it suces to show that
-VCG satises outcome closure. Fix valuation functions
vj and types j for all j 2 N, and consider an arbitrary
agent i 2 N. We claim that for every xi 2 Xi and every
^ x i 2 ^ X i,
ui((

i ; ^ x i);i)  ui((xi; ^ x i);i):
To see this, observe that there exists ^  i 2  i such that
^ 

 i = ^ x i, and consider the type prole (i; ^  i). Holzman
et al. [16] have shown that the projection of the true types
to a quasi-eld  is an ex-post equilibrium of the (fully ex-
pressive) VCG mechanism. Thus, in particular, 

i is a best
response to ^ 

 i = ^ x i, which proves the claim.
For the direction from left to right, assume that  is not a
quasi-eld. Holzman et al. [16] have shown that in this case,

 is not an ex-post equilibrium of the VCG mechanism.
On the other hand, 
 is a dominant-strategy equilibrium
of -VCG, because -VCG is maximal in range. This shows
that -VCG is not tight.
Together with Theorem 4, this yields a characterization
of the ex-post equilibria of -VCG for the case when  is a
quasi-eld.
Corollary 2. Let  be a quasi-eld. Then, ^ x is an ex-
post equilibrium of -VCG under variable participation if
and only if ^ x = 
0
for some quasi-eld 
0  .
Since a quasi-eld of size m can contain at most logm bun-
dles that are pairwise disjoint, insisting that a simplication
be tight does come at a cost, decreasing the worst-case social
welfare in the truthful projection by an additional factor of
up to
p
m=logm. Still, as discussed above, tightness brings
other advantages to the simplied mechanism.
6. THE ROLE OF INFORMATION
Like most of the literature on sponsored search auctions,
we have assumed that agents have complete information
about each others' valuations for the dierent slots. It turns
out that this assumption is crucial, and that the positive
results for -GSP do not extend to incomplete information
settings.
In particular, -GSP admits an ex-post equilibrium only
in very degenerate cases. This complements a result of
Gomes and Sweeney [13], who showed that -GSP has an ef-
cient Bayes-Nash equilibrium on type space 
 if and only
if  decreases suciently quickly. Of course, ex-post equi-
librium is stronger than Bayes-Nash equilibrium, but on the
other hand our result precludes the existence of the former
for a signicantly larger type space. The proofs of all results
in this section are given in the full version of the paper.
Theorem 6. Let ; 2 R
n
>. Then, -GSP has an ecient
ex-post equilibrium on type space 
 if and only if n  2 or
k  1, even if  = .
The -VCG mechanism does only slightly better: it has
an ex-post equilibrium only when it allows agents to bid
truthfully (it is thus not a meaningful simplication, in that
the language is in this sense exact).
Theorem 7. Let ; 2 R
n
>. Then, -VCG has an ecient
ex-post equilibrium on type space 
 if and only if  = ,
or n  2, or k  1.
These results indicate that simplication is not very use-
ful in sponsored search auctions without the assumption of
complete information amongst bidders. Interestingly, sim-
plication is also not necessary in this case to preclude equi-
libria with bad properties, at least in the special case of our
model where the valuations are proportional to some (possi-
bly unknown) vector of value-generating click-through rates.
In particular, payments in every ecient ex-post equilibrium
of the fully expressive VCG mechanism equal the VCG pay-
ments. Moreover, truthful reporting is the only ecient ex-
post equilibrium when the number of agents is greater than
the number of slots.
Proposition 6. Consider a VCG sponsored search auction
with type prole  2 
, and assume that s = (s1;:::;sn)
is an ecient ex-post equilibrium. Then, for all i with 1 
i  k, the payment for slot i in the outcome for strategy
prole s equals pi =
Pmin(k;n 1)
j=i ((j   j+1)  vj+1(j+1)).
Moreover, if n > k, then si(k;i) = k  vi(i) for all i with
1  i  n.
In considering simplications for combinatorial auctions,
we have adopted the standard approach to assume incom-
plete information amongst agents, and in particular dis-
cussed a family of simplications of the VCG mechanism
that oers a tradeo between social welfare and the amount
of information agents have to communicate.
One may wonder why this tradeo is necessary, and in
how far it depends on the amount of information agents have
about each others' types. It turns out that in the complete
information case a much smaller number of bids is enough to
preserve an ecient equilibrium, and in fact all equilibria,
of the fully expressive VCG mechanism.
We show this using a simplication of the VCG mecha-
nisms that we call n-VCG. The message space of n-VCG
consists of all bid vectors with at most n non-zero entries,
where n is the number of agents. This reduces the number
of bids elicited from each agent from 2
k to at most n, which
can be exponentially smaller. Surprisingly, this simplica-
tion is both tight and total, i.e., the set of Nash equilibria
is completely unaected by this restriction of the message
space.
Theorem 8. The n-VCG mechanism is tight and total with
respect to Nash equilibria.
7. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we have studied simplications of mecha-
nisms obtained by restricting their message space, and have
found that they can be used to solve dierent kinds of equi-
librium selection problems that occur in practice. Direct rev-
elation mechanisms typically have several equilibria, which
might be more or less desirable from the point of view of the
designer. Computational constraints might also imply that
only a subset of the equilibria of a mechanisms can actu-
ally be achieved, in which case agents might have to select
among several Pareto optimal equilibria. On the other hand,
restricting the message space of a mechanism often reduces
the amount of social welfare that can be achieved theoreti-
cally, and this seems to pivot on whether or not agents have
complete information about each others' types. The choicebetween mechanisms with dierent degrees of expressiveness
therefore involves a tradeo between a benet of simplicity
and a price of simplicity.
The price of simplicity can easily be quantied, for ex-
ample, by the loss in social welfare potentially incurred by
a simplication, and has been studied in the context of
both sponsored search and combinatorial auctions. Abrams
et al. [1] and Blumrosen et al. [7], among others, have
given bounds on the loss of social welfare incurred by -
GSP for dierent classes of valuations that are not propor-
tional to the click-through rates. Christodoulou et al. [8]
and Bhawalkar and Roughgarden [5] have studied the po-
tential loss in welfare when a set of items is sold through
a simplication of the combinatorial auction in which only
bids that are additive in items are allowed. This bidding
language requires only a small number of bids, and welfare
in equilibrium turns out to be smaller by at most a loga-
rithmic factor in the number of agents than the optimum
achieved by the fully expressive mechanism.
The benet of simplicity is much harder to grasp as a con-
cept. In this paper we have argued that simplication can
improve the economic properties of a mechanism by preclud-
ing bad or promoting good equilibria. A remaining challenge
is to understand the benet of simplicity in the context of
simplied mechanisms for which the computation of an equi-
librium might be an intractable problem, like the ones of
Christodoulou et al. and Bhawalkar and Roughgarden de-
scribed above. In contrast to the simplications considered
in the present paper, these mechanisms may not be able
to solve the computational or informational problem of en-
abling agents to bid in a straightforward way. More gen-
erally, it is far from obvious how \straightforwardness" of a
mechanism should be measured, but it seems reasonable to
require that agents' strategies can be computed in polyno-
mial time.
REFERENCES
[1] Z. Abrams, A. Ghosh, and E. Vee. Cost of conciseness
in sponsored search auctions. In Proc. of 3rd WINE,
volume 4858 of LNCS, pages 326{334, 2007.
[2] L. M. Ausubel and P. Milgrom. The lovely but lonely
Vickrey auction. In P. Cramton, Y. Shoham, and
P. Steinberg, editors, Combinatorial Auctions, chap-
ter 1, pages 17{40. MIT Press, 2006.
[3] M. Babaio and T. Roughgarden. Equilibrium e-
ciency and price complexity in sponsored search auc-
tions. In Proc. of 6th Workshop on Ad Auctions, 2010.
[4] M. Benisch, N. Sadeh, and T. Sandholm. A theory of
expressiveness in mechanisms. In Proc. of 23rd AAAI
Conference, pages 17{23, 2008.
[5] K. Bhawalkar and T. Roughgarden. Welfare guaran-
tees for combinatorial auctions with item bidding. In
Proc. of 22nd SODA, pages 700{709, 2011.
[6] L. Blumrosen, N. Nisan, and I. Segal. Auctions with
severely bounded communication. Journal of Articial
Intelligence Research, 28:233{266, 2007.
[7] L. Blumrosen, J. Hartline, and S. Nong. Position auc-
tions and non-uniform conversion rates. In Proc. of 4th
Workshop on Ad Auctions, 2008.
[8] G. Christodoulou, A. Kov acs, and M. Schapira.
Bayesian combinatorial auctions. In Proc. of 35th
ICALP, pages 820{832, 2008.
[9] E. H. Clarke. Multipart pricing of public goods. Public
Choice, 11:17{33, 1971.
[10] V. Conitzer and T. Sandholm. Computational criti-
cisms of the revelation principle. In Proc. of 4th ACM-
EC Conference, pages 262{263, 2004.
[11] B. Edelman, M. Ostrovsky, and M. Schwartz. Internet
advertising and the generalized second price auction:
Selling billions of dollars worth of keywords. American
Economic Review, 97(1):242{259, 2007.
[12] M. Feldman and L. Blumrosen. Implementation with a
bounded action space. In Proc. of 7th ACM-EC Con-
ference, pages 62{71, 2006.
[13] R. D. Gomes and K. S. Sweeney. Bayes-Nash equilibria
of the generalized second price auction. In Proc. of 10th
ACM-EC Conference, pages 107{108, 2009.
[14] T. Groves. Incentives in teams. Econometrica, 41:617{
631, 1973.
[15] R. Holzman and D. Monderer. Characterization of ex
post equilibrium in the VCG combinatorial auctions.
Games and Economic Behavior, 47:87{103, 2004.
[16] R. Holzman, N. Kr-Dahav, D. Monderer, and M. Ten-
nenholtz. Bundling equilibrium in combinatorial auc-
tions. Games and Economic Behavior, 47:104{123,
2004.
[17] N. Hyal and C. Boutilier. Partial revelation automated
mechanism design. In Proc. of 22nd AAAI Conference,
pages 72{78, 2007.
[18] N. Hyal and C. Boutilier. Mechanism design with par-
tial revelation. In Proc. of 20th IJCAI, pages 1333{
1340, 2007.
[19] S. Lahaie and D. C. Parkes. On the communication
requirements of verifying the VCG outcome. In Proc. of
9th ACM-EC Conference, pages 108{113, 2008.
[20] S. Lahaie, D. M. Pennock, A. Saberi, and R. V. Vohra.
Sponsored search auctions. In N. Nisan, T. Roughgar-
den, E. Tardos, and V. Vazirani, editors, Algorithmic
Game Theory, chapter 28, pages 699{716. Cambridge
University Press, 2007.
[21] H. B. Leonard. Elicitation of honest preferences for
the assignment of individuals to positions. Journal of
Political Economy, 91(3):461{479, 1983.
[22] P. Milgrom. Simplied mechanisms with an application
to sponsored-search auctions. Games and Economic
Behavior, 70(1):62{70, 2010.
[23] N. Nisan and A. Ronen. Computationally feasible VCG
mechanisms. Journal of Articial Intelligence Research,
29:19{47, 2007.
[24] N. Nisan and I. Segal. The communication requirements
of ecient allocations and supporting prices. Journal
of Economic Theory, 129(1):192{224, 2006.
[25] S. Shakkottai, R. Srikant, A. Ozdaglar, and D. Ace-
moglu. The price of simplicity. IEEE Journal on
Selected Areas in Communications, 26(7):1269{1276,
2008.
[26] H. Varian. Position auctions. International Journal of
Industrial Organization, 25:1163{1178, 2007.
[27] W. Vickrey. Counterspeculation, auctions, and com-
petitive sealed tenders. Journal of Finance, 16(1):8{37,
1961.